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The topic of scientific explanation resides at the centre of attention of phi-
losophers of science for more than the last sixty years. Although its roots 
reach the Antiquity, the intense discussion of its conceptual and empiri-
cal character has commenced by Carl G. Hempel’s papers on models of 
scientific explanation––especially his Studies in the Logic of Explanation 
(1948), co-authored by Paul Oppenheim. Where Hempel and his estab-
lished critics stopped, the authors of a new book Scientific Explanation try 
to continue, as they announce.
The concise book Scientific Explanation is published under the edi-
tion “Springer Briefs in Philosophy” which is a modern introductory for-
mat discussing the state of the art of various philosophical topics. It is 
always a challenge for authors of such a format to come with a compre-
hensible, fresh, and not too oversimplified account of the area they present 
in such a limited space. In case of Scientific Explanation, I would say that 
Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel, and Leen De Vreese did their best.
Besides Introduction, their presentation of the explanatory project in 
the philosophy of science covers four chapters on no more than one hun-
dred pages.
Chapter One, Theories of Scientific Explanation, begins with an out-
line of one of the most systematically developed conceptions of scientific 
explanation––that of Carl Hempel. The clear exposition of his two basic 
models––the Deductive-Nomological model (DN) and the Inductive-Sta-
tistical model (IS)––is accompanied with an overview of some of the reac-
tions to several problems arising in those accounts. The authors proceed 
yet further and examine critically two other influential conceptions: Philip 
Kitcher’s Unification Account and Wesley Salmon’s Causal-Mechanical 
Model. Although the authors’ introduction to these explanatory concep-
tions is dressed in a bit short-spoken language, the particular explanations 
they use are helpful for a practical appraisal of the theories.
The authors’ own philosophical project of answering the question 
of how to study scientific explanation is the topic of Chapter Two. First, 
the authors reconstruct the explicata of explanation-concept in Hempel’s, 
Kitcher’s, and Salmon’s conceptions. Second, they claim that neither 
Hempel, nor Kitcher, nor Salmon provide enough evidence for their (quite 
general) descriptive and normative claims about the explanatory practice 
in science. Finally, building on the method of explication, the authors argue 
for their own moderate methodological project of studying and displaying 
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(the forms of) scientific explanations. They call it “A Pragmatic Approach 
to Explanation”. It is an approach employing three simple principles: i) 
make context-dependent normative claims and argue for them; ii) make 
context-dependent descriptive claims and argue for them; and iii) in doing 
i) and ii), take into account the epistemic interests (of scientists seeking an 
explanation). Though the underlying idea of their approach is attractive, 
the format of the book is a clear limitation for its proper development.
However, the authors try to come close to some of the details of their 
project in Chapter Three, where a toolbox for describing and evaluat-
ing explanatory practices is provided. They discuss several types of ex-
plananda-questions as well as various possible formats of answering such 
questions. Moreover, they try to introduce the tools for evaluation of ex-
planations in form of clusters of (evaluative) questions. Nonetheless, what 
their evaluating-part-of-the-project misses the most is a clear statement of 
what counts as the adequate answer to such evaluative questions. And it is 
just after such a statement that we could say of the normative part of their 
project how it stands to other methodological conceptions.
The last chapter of the book, called Examples of Descriptions and 
Evaluations of Explanatory Practices, contains more elaborated examples 
of explanations from various scientific and research fields––starting with 
Feynman’s investigation of Challenger Disaster and ending with Merton’s 
explanation of success and failure of propaganda. Although presented in 
a very rough form, it is these examples of particular explanations that 
authors use to test their pragmatic approach to explanation. And it is this 
very feature of the book that makes it an original, interesting and stimulat-
ing contribution to the up-to-date methodological discussion on models of 
scientific explanation.
Now, one general comment is in order. The particular instances of 
scientific explanations presented by authors––and, especially, the ex-
plananda of the discussed explanations––are (almost ever) expressed in 
terms of some particular theory or theories. Then it is an understanding of 
the vocabulary of theory what seems to be a necessary condition for at-
taining an understanding of a given explanation. In other words, we can be 
consumers of scientific explanations without really understanding them. 
In case we do not understand some of the key concepts (and their relations 
to other concepts in a conceptual network of a theory), in which the ex-
planandum of an explanation is expressed, we are unlikely to understand 
the explanans of that explanation. And it is this point, I suppose, where 
explanation comes close to understanding, yet is utterly missing in au-
thors’ account.
It seems fair to say that the authors of Scientific Explanation resigned 
of the grand project of a general explanatory account, such as Hempel’s 
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theory. It is this moment which diverges them most from the previous phil-
osophical efforts. Nevertheless, Scientific Explanation brings for various 
audiences not only an updated and concise summary of the most influen-
tial philosophies of explanation but also a fresh and incentive contribution 
to the descriptive and normative aspects of this fascinating topic.
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Filozofski leksikon, uredio Stipe Kutleša (Zagreb: Leksikografski 
zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2012), 1299 str.
U širokoj lepezi izdanja leksikona Leksikografskog zavoda Miroslav 
Krleža, nakon Pomorskog leksikona (1990), Medicinskog leksikona 
(1992), Ekonomskog leksikona (1995), Hrvatskog općeg leksikona 
(1996), Općeg religijskog leksikona (2002), Filmskog leksikona (2003), 
Nogometnog leksikona (2004), Hrvatskog obiteljskog leksikona (2005), 
Zagrebačkog leksikona (2006), Tehničkog leksikona (2007), Pravnog leksi-
kona (2007), Hrvatskog biografskog leksikona (projekt je u tijeku), Leksi-
kona Marina Držića s Bibliografijom (2009), Hrvatskog franjevačkog 
biografskog leksikona (2010), Ekonomskog leksikona (20112), Leksikona 
Ruđera Boškovića (2011), na red je došla i filozofija te je 2012. godine 
objavljen Filozofski leksikon.
Opsežan projekt pripreme i izdavanja leksikona posvećenog filozofiji 
započeo je Danilo Pejović (1928–2007), a nakon njegove smrti započeti 
posao je kao glavni urednik završio Stipe Kutleša. Leksikon sadrži 3500 
leksikografskih natuknica. Na njegovu nastajanju radilo je 154 autora iz 
četrdesetak različitih institucija iz Australije, Bosne i Hercegovine, Crne 
Gore, Hrvatske, Japana, Mađarske, Makedonije, Njemačke, Slovenije, Sr-
bije i Ukrajine. Valja napomenuti kako su u Leksikonu surađivali zaposlenici 
gotovo svih institucija u Republici Hrvatskoj koje se bave filozofijom: 
Instituta za filozofiju, Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Filo-
zofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta 
